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i

This article provides an analysis of the procedural aspects of the right to silencl falling
within Art.6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The author exam'nes the
jurisprudence ofthe European Court offfurnunRights under thefollowing areas: o erview,
appearance to answer questions, a demand for documents, false responses, warni gs and
adverse inferences. The subject is discussed at investigation stage, just prior to an during
civil and criminal proceedings. The piece concludes with summaries of the jurispru ence in
i
these varying circumstances.

1
i

Introduction
Since the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) entered into
substantial body of law has developed that defines the scope of the
vidual human rights guarantees. In numerous decisions, the
Rights has carefully weighed competing governmental
effort to produce a carefully balanced structure that

* The author gratefully acknowledges assistance provided by personnel of the
the Court's invitation to the author to serve as a Visiting Scholar in 2005.
on this article were completed at the Rockefeller Foundation Conference
where the author was privileged to work as a Visiting Scholar.
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scope f r individual freedom without unduly impeding the exercise of governmental
authori y.
The evelopment of a jurisprudence of self-incrimination by the European Court
represerts an attempt by the Court to create a clearly defined set of human rights
protectjons under the ECHR, although there are many areas where uncertainty persists.1
In a ser'es of cases arising under the laws of a number of different countries, the Court has
been sy\ternatically attempting to forge a mature right to silence that permits individuals
to resis State compulsion to provide self-incriminatory information. At the same time,
howev~r,the Court has made it clear that the right to silence is not absolute and that its
scope qepends upon the setting in which self-incriminatoryinformation is sought.
Undystandably, the focus of the Court's decisions has been to identify the
circum+tances that justify the exercise of the right to remain silent. The Court has
been cqncerned with such issues as the type of pressure exerted by officials, what kind
of info~mationhas been sought and what consequences are established by domestic
law if fhe demand for information is refused. Answers to these questions define the
substadtive contours of the right to remain silent and in the process establish the limits of
state a thority to compel the production of potentially self-incriminatory information.
Although it is appropriate for the European Court of Human Rights to focus its
attentidn on defining the substantive scope of the right to silence, each case presented to
it inevitably involves procedural issues as well. While some of the procedural questions
issues that are generally encountered in litigation, others reflect concerns
the assertion of the right to silence. For example, must an individual assert
in response to specific inquiries or may she or he decline to answer
all questions; is an individual faced with potentially compelled self-incrimination free
to choose between refusing to respond and answering official questions subject to a later
complaint when the information is used; may the state impose adverse consequences
if an i 'dividual falsely answers questions that never should have been asked; and are
there s me settings in which warnings of the right to silence are required?
The purpose of this article is to focus attention on some of the procedural issues that
occur when the right to silence is asserted. Although such issues are readily apparent
I
in maqy
of the European Court's right to silence cases, its decisions have not fully
explored what role they should play in determining whether the State may obtain the
inform tion it seeks. However, the reality is that substance and procedure go hand
in han in defining both the scope and strength of an individual's right to remain
silent nder the European Convention. Procedural considerations may serve to limit
the abi ity of the State to demand the production of information or they may minimize
the valhe of the right to resist compelled self-incrimination by making the claim more
'difficult to assert.
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The right to silence under the European Convention: An overview
The fact that the European Convention on Human Rights has been interpreted to
include a right to silence was not preordained since the Convention itself contains no
,
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The ECtHR's right to silence rulings are explored in Mark Berger, "Europeanizing SelfIncrimination: The Right to Remain Silent in the European Court of Human Rights" (2006) 12
Columbia Journal of European Law 339.
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516 Self-Incriminationand the European Court of Human Rights
language creating any such protection. The most relevant provisions in the Convention
are those contained in Art.6 which establish a general right to fair procedures2 along
with a number of specific guarantees including notice of charges,3 adequate time for
,~
attendance and examination of witnesses: and a
preparation of a d e f e n ~ ecompelled
Why the framers of the Convention did not
guarantee of the presumption of inn~cence.~
include specific language creating a right to silence, a right later explicitly incor'porated
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,7 is not clear. Neve theless,
the absence of a Convention provision creating a right to silence has not eterred
the European Court of Human Rights from concluding that the Convention provides
equivalent protection.
Funke v France8 represents the European Court's earliest affirmation of , ight to
silence protections under the Convention. French Customs authorities had1 sought
various financial records in connection with an investigation into the violation of
French Customs regulations. Funke was fined for failing to turn over the isoughtafter documents, but the Court concluded that the procedure involved imperhissible
compulsion to produce self-incriminatory information in violation of the Conbention.
The Court observed that:

h

i.

"being unable or unwilling to procure [the documents] by some other me&, [the
government] attempted to compel the applicant himself to provide the {lidence
of offences he had allegedly committed. The special features of customs law . . .
cannot justify such an infringement of the right of anyone 'charged with a riminal
offence', within the autonomous meaning of this expression in Article , . . ., to
remain silent and not to contribute to incriminating him~elf."~

I
I

In subsequent cases the Court attempted to give a fuller explanation of its reasons
for incorporating the right to silence into the corpus of fair trial guarantees uqder the
Convention. Its opinion in Murray v United Kingdomlo relied upon the widesprea/l acceptance of the legal principle barring compelled self-incrimination as well as the b lief that
protection of the right to silence would help to ensure fair procedures and the avpidance
of unjustified convictions. This was expressed by the Court in its observation tyat:

7

"there can be no doubt that the right to remain silent under police cpeAtioning
and the privilege against self-incrimination are generally recognised interbational
standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6
. . .. By providing the accused with protection against improper cornpulsio~by the
I

The specific language provides for a right to a "fair and public hearing." ECHR ~rd.6(1).
Ibid., at Art.6(3)(a).
:
Ibid., at Art.6(3)(b).
I
Ibid., at Art.6(3)(e).
Ibid., at Art.6(2).
7The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted December 19. 1966,
Art.l4(3)(g),999 U.N.T.S. 171 provides that "everyone shall be entitled. . .[n]ot to be combelled to
I
testify against himself or to confess guilt".
(1993) 16 E.H.R.R. 297.
Ibid., at [44].
lo (1996) 22 E.H.R.R. 29.

!
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a4horities these immunities contribute to avoiding miscarriages of justice and to
seturing the aims of Article 6.""
In ~auddersv United Kingdoml2 the Court further explained that recognition of the right
to sileqce provides support for the presumption of innocence by forcing the State to
produqe independent proof of the defendant's guilt without being tempted to coerce
self-incriminatory evidence from the accused.13
I
Sincg recognising the right to silence as protected under the Convention, the European
Court $as steadily expanded its reach in a series of important rulings. The result is that
the prqhibition against compelled self-incrimination now applies in a wide variety of
setting$. However, the Court has been careful to point out that the right to silence is
not ab olute, and how it applies depends upon the circumstances of each case, with
every qpplication requiring a careful balance between conflicting state and individual
interests.
At t$e core of the right to silence European Court decisions provide the firmest
protecqon. This is illustrated in two Court rulings finding Irish convictions to be in
violati n of the Convention. Both Heaney v Ireland14 and Quinn v Ireland15involved the
applicqtion of an Irish law that criminalised the refusal of a suspect to answer police
questiqns concerning crimes under the Offences Against the State Act 1939. The Irish
State's bttempt to justify using the threat of criminal punishment to compel potentially
self-inqriminatory evidence on the grounds that "the information sought could be
essential for the investigation of serious and subversive crime"I6 was rejected by the
~ u r o ~ j Court.
a n In its ruling the Court took the position that:

S

9

" t e security and public order concerns relied on by the State cannot justify
a provision which extinguishes the very essence of the applicants' rights to
silbnce and privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by Article 6 !j 1 of
the Convention."17

P

r

he information is sought by the State for purposes that are not strictly or
solely , riminal, the applicable analysis is more complex. In some cases of this sort

"

Ibid., at [45]. In an earlier decision, the European Court of Justice had observed that "an
analysi of national laws has indeed shown that there is a common principle enshrining the right
not to ive evidence against oneself". Orkem SA (formerly CdF Chimie SA) v Commission of the
European Communities, [I9891E.C.R. 3283 at [98].In support of this observation the Court reviewed
rulings of European Union members applying the right to silence. Ibid, at [99-1101.
l2 (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 313.
l3 This justification was reflected in the Court's observation that the
"right not to incriminate oneself, in particular, presupposes that the prosecution in a criminal
case seek to prove their case against the accused without resort to evidence obtained through
methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused. In this sense the
right is closely linked to the presumption of innocence contained in Article 6 para. 2 of the
Cdnvention."
Ibid., at [68].
l4 (2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 12.
l5 (App. No.36887/97), judgment of December 21,2000.
l 6 Heaney and McGuiness, fn.15 above, at [33].
l7 Ibid., at [58].
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518 Self-Incrimination and the European,Courtof Human Rights
a criminal prosecution may lie just beneath the surface. Such was the case in Saunders
v United Kingdom," where the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry
(DTI) undertook an investigation of an illegal stock support scheme implemented by
Saunders in connection with a corporate takeover. Saunders complied with ii directive
that he answer potentially self-incriminatory questions under threat of contempt, and his
responses were used at his subsequent criminal prosecution for violating the Uompanies
Act of 1985. However, this was held by the European Court to violate Art.6(1) of the
I
Convention.
While the majority opinion emphasised the fact that Saunders' compelled statements
were later used at his criminal trial as the basis for its conclusion, a concurrdg opinion
suggested that the system of statutory compulsion was objectionable in itself, whether
or not subsequent use was made of any resulting statements.19However, thelEuropean
Court has been careful to insure that its right to silence rulings do not totally dndermine
regulatory reporting requirements, observing in Allen v United Kingdom that the
I

I

"right not to incriminate oneself is primarily concerned, however, with tespecting
the will of an accused person to remain silent in the context of criminal prpceedings
and the use made of compulsorily obtained information in criminal prasecutions.
It does not per se prohibit the use of compulsory powers to require persons to
provide information about their financial or company affairs."20
I
Nevertheless, exactly when a compelled reporting system crosses the l 4 e remains
unclear. One factor noted by the Court is the nature of the penalty for non-cdmpliance.
Saunders, in which the Court found infringement of the right to silence, involved a
potential prison sentence of two years for refusing to answer DTI questiond whereas
the subject in Allen faced a maximum fine of £300. Whether this minimk adverse
consequence would have validated the compelled reporting requirement In Allen is
uncertain, however, because Allen himself fit into the category of those w
incomplete or misinformation for which the Court has thus far refused to
to silence pr~tection.~'
In another series of cases the European Court
requirements in the context of the enforcement
based upon the Court's assertion that information identifying
a vehicle involved in a traffic offence "is not in itself
Court's rulings, moreover, did not involve
or were at least anti~ipated".~~
More
United Kingdom," the Court considered the use of a threatened criminal proqecution to
I
I

l8 Fn.13, above.
l9 Ibid., Concurring Opinion of

Judge Morenilla.
v United Kingdom, (2002)35 E.H.R.R. CD 289, The Facts, at [A].
See fnn.54-67 above, and accompanying text.
22 Weh v Austria (2005) 40 E.H.R.R. 37. On the treatment of this issue under the
United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, as well as the ECHR, see Mark Berger, '
Self-Reporting and the Principle Against Compelled Self-Incrimination: Some
Perspectives" [2006] E.H.R.L.R. 25-38.
23 Ibid., at [52].
24 (App. Nos 15809/02 and 25624/02), judgment of June 29,2007.
20 Allen
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a

identification of a driver who was caught on camera speeding. Relying on
in Jalloh v Germany,25the Court concluded that:

"i order to determine whether the essence of the applicants' right to remain silent
an privilege against self-incrimination was infringed, the Court will focus on the
na re and degree of compulsion used to obtain the evidence, the existence of any
re1 vant safeguards in the procedure, and the use to which any material so obtained

e

WT

I
4

Whe e self-incrimination protections are available, the fact that the State is barred
from c~iminalisingnon-cooperation has not led the Court to prohibit all adverse
conseqjences. In a series of cases the Court has found that UK legislation providing for
advers~
inferences where suspects refuse to answer police questions and where criminal
defend~ntsdo not testify at trial does not violate the fair procedure requirements of
Art.6 o the Convention. However, an adverse inference is only appropriate if the
S U S ~ ~ C
silence
~ S
is due to the lack of a credible explanation,27no conviction may be
based s lel or mainly on adverse inferences from silence:'
and the jury must receive
P
proper nstructions on when and how adverse inferences from silence may be drawn.29
I
Apppation
of the right to silence under the Convention presupposes that no
procedpral obstacles have been encountered in the presentation of the claim. But
whethek there are or should be procedural components to the freedom from compelled
self-inc imination is itself a separate question. Moreover, given the wide variety of
setting, in which right to silence issues arise, procedural requirements, to the extent
they ar' imposed, may vary from one case to another. Although these issues have not
been i the forefront of the European Court's right to silence decisions, the Court may
well f q d itself addressing questions of this sort in the future as it more fully develops
silence principles under the Convention's Art.6 fair procedure standard.

f

/

e

7
I

To appear or not to appear
When bn individual is called upon to answer official questions related to his or her
condu 't, and if that conduct may be a violation of the criminal law, potential issues of
self-in imination are readily apparent. In some circumstances the connection between
the an wers sought and incriminatory evidence will be clear, as where the authorities
inquird about whether the individual was in the location where a criminal offence

i
1

25 (2007) 44 E.H.R.R. 32. In ]alloh the Court found that the forced administration of emetics to
reveal a drug offence violated the right to silence and privilege against self-incrimination, even
though kt resulted in the production of real evidence having an existence independent of the will
of the s+spect.
26 Fd.25, above, at [55].
27 Id the words of the European Court, if the factfinder was "satisfied that the applicant's
silence kt the police interview could not sensibly be attributed to his having no answer or none
that wduld stand up to police questioning it should not draw an adverse inference". Condron v
United Kingdom (2001) 31 E.H.R.R. 1at [61].
Fn.11 above, at [47].
29 Condron, fn.27 above, at [62].
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occurred at the time of its commission. Often, however, the self-incriminatory potential
of the official inquiry will be indirect, resulting in uncertainty as to whether a valid right
to silence claim can be made.
Interchanges about potential criminal conduct regularly occur when police authorities
conduct their investigations. Typically, they direct questions to those who may be at the
scene of the offence or who are later identified as potentially involved. The individual
to whom the questions are addressed must then decide whether or not to answek. These
are not situations in which individuals are compelled to appear for questioning since
they are already there, but it is also true that police are not granted the authbrity to
require answers. Consequently, the individual being questioned must decide hhether
I
to answer all, some, or none of the questioner's inquiries.30
In other settings, however, officials are granted the authority to compel individuals
to appear before an official body and answer questions. If the questions relbte to a
criminal offence and the right to silence is applicable, the individual may bk given
the option to withhold potentially self-incriminatory information. But if the/ risk is
sufficiently apparent in advance, should there also be a right to refuse to appeat before
the questioner entirely thereby in effect declining to answer all questions regarhless of
whether any specific question has a potential incriminatory impact?
Anytime information may be withheld on self-incrimination grounds
interest in fully performing its investigatory functions may be impeded. ~ h w e v e r ,
that interference would be limited if only questions with specific self-incri
risks could be blocked by an assertion of the right to silence. Other
a character not infringing on the privilege against self-incrimination
obtainable. In contrast, individuals facing self-incrimination risks who are prepared
to assert the right to silence may well prefer not to have to
regardless of their potential incriminatory character. Given the possible
to the self-incriminatory risk of specific information the State may seek,
may logically conclude that the safest course is a blanket refusal to
if that option is available.
In one area a consensus exists that an individual may legitimately refuse toianswer
all questions on self-incrimination grounds even though the setting is one w ere the
State is generally entitled to a response. Despite the fact that the State
compel witnesses in a trial to answer relevant and non-privileged questions,
does not apply to a criminal defendant. Instead, criminal defendants are free
the witness stand at all, although European Court cases do permit
be drawn from the defendant's failure to testify.31
Two possible explanations provide strong support for the extra right toisilence
protection given to criminal defendants at trial. First, since the prosecution's Jestions

h

30 Interchanges between police and citizens raise the additional procedural question

or under what circumstances a warning of the right to silence must be administered.
above, and accompanying text.
31 Fn.11, above. In a series of cases the European Court has provided
circumstances that warrant the use of adverse inferences from a suspect's
police questions and a criminal defendant's refusal to take the witness
Kingdom (2003) 36 E.H.R.R. 13; Averill v United Kingdom (2001) 31
Kingdom (2001)31 E.H.R.R. 35; Condron v United Kingdom, fn.27, above.

[2007]E.H.R.L.R. JSSUE 5. O SWEET
& MAXWELL
LTD2007

1

j
Article

Mark Berger 521
I

to the diefendant generally have the objective of establishing his guilt or undermining
his def&ce, the risk of incrimination is so clearly present that it is permissible to assume
its existpce with respect to every inquiry. Secondly, criminal defendants are judged by
the factlfinder not only by the testimony they give, but also by their general demeanour.
Allowiyg the defendant to refuse to take the witness stand thus provides him with the
opportunity to avoid creating an unfavourable impression even where the testimony he
might give would not be self-in~rirninator~.~'
The fact that an individual is called to answer questions in a setting other than
a crimipal trial does not preclude the possibility that the answers he provides will
constitdte evidence of a criminal offence. However, this risk can be dealt with by giving
the indjvidual the right not to answer specific incriminatory questions or allowing him
to decl" e to appear entirely. The American Supreme Court has resolved this problem
for fed ral grand jury investigations by requiring non-defendants to appear in response
to a su poena and answer all otherwise proper inquiries subject to the right to claim
the pri ilege against self-incrimination with respect to individual questions that present
a self-' crimination risk.33However, the right to decline to answer may be removed
if constitutionally sufficient protection from the use of the answers is granted.34 In
contrast, a number of American states afford the target of a criminal investigation the
right ndt to appear at all, thus providing investigatory targets the same right to silence
protectjon as criminal defendants at
Outside of the criminal trial itself, there is no immediate risk that an individual
compepd to answer official questions will be convicted of a criminal offence. The
answerg may have adverse consequences at some later point, but this is not the same
as hav&g a criminal jury or judge present to hear the incriminatory responses which
they w uld then be able to use to determine guilt or innocence. Nevertheless, a criminal
charge nd trial may be looming in the near future at the time the compelled questioning
is unddrtaken. The impression created by the individual may influence the decision to
charge /and the information obtained through compulsion may become evidence that
can be hsed to support a conviction. Thus, although the settings are not identical, the
case foi a right not to appear still exists.

!

1
I

I

32 lnl a

case in which the United States Supreme Court barred adverse reference to the
defenddnt's failure to testify, it commented that "[e]xcessive timidity, nervousness when facing
others and attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious character, and offenses charged
against [the defendant], will often confuse and embarrass him to such a degree as to increase
rather tban remove prejudices against him. It is not every one, however honest, who would
therefo e willingly be placed on the witness stand". Wilson v United States, 149 U.S. 60,66 (1893).
33 T ~ was
s viewed by the American Supreme Court as a reflection of the larger principle that
"[tlhe piublic has a right to every man's evidence". United States v Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 572
(1976). $0-called "putative" or "virtual" defendants in federal prosecutions are not even entitled
to the Miranda warnings of the right to silence that individuals subject to custodial interrogation
must receive.
34 Kastigar v United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) imposed the requirement that authorities not
make use or derivative use of any information obtained as a result of a grant of immunity.
35 E.g. State v Criminal Court ofMarion County, 263 Ind. 236,329 N.E.2d 573 (Ind. 1975);People
v Steuding, 6 N.Y.2d 214,160 N.E.2d 468 (N.Y. 1959).

1
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Right to silence issues arising in the context of national laws requiring individuals to appear and answer potentially incriminatory questions or provide potentially
incriminatory information have been presented to the European Court in several cases.
There is some inconsistency in the Court's rulings on this question, and views have been
expressed in concurring and dissenting opinions that would provide dramatically different solutions to the problem based on differing views of the scope of the right to siilence.
Serves v France36illustrates one approach. There a French officer and several comrades
had been charged in connection with a homicide. However, because of a procedural
irregularity, the initial judicial investigation and all subsequent proceedings were
declared void.37This was followed by a second investigation in which Serves, grior to
being recharged in connection with the homicide, was called to appear before a military '
investigating judge as a witness in the case on three separate occasions. Each time he
refused to take the oath and give evidence as a result of which he was subjedted to
three separate fines.38Serves claimed this to be a breach of his Art.6 9 1 rightinot to
incriminate himself, but the European Court disagreed.
Although the Court recognized that Serves had a legitimate concern that s me of
the evidence he might have provided could have been self-incriminatory, it con, luded
that the proper response would have been for him "to have refused to answer any
questions from the judge that were likely to steer him in that d i r e ~ t i o n " .~~ e~ f u s i n ~
to take the oath and answer all questions, however, was not a permissible opcon. In
the Court's view, the French procedure involving fines for refusing to appear did not
represent impermissible compulsion to answer potentially incriminating questiohs, but
I
rather was only a means of ensuring truthful responses.40
In a more recent decision, Shannon v United Kingd0rn.4~the European Court prbvided
broader right to silence protection for individuals summoned to answer pot4ntially
self-incriminatory questions. Unlike Serves, Shannon had already been validly charged
with financial offences when he was summoned to appear before financial investigators
to determine whether anyone else had gained from his actions." Shannon ?fused
to attend the interview and was ultimately convicted and fined for his c0nduct.4~
although he was never prosecuted for the offences that were the subject of the driginal
investigation.44
I

1

I
(1999)28 E.H.R.R. 265.
37 Ibid., at [IS].
1
38 Ibid., at [21]and [22].
39 Ibid., at [47].
" Ibid. In contrast, a dissenting opinion saw the procedure as one in which Serves "bust in
36

1

reality have felt forced to give evidence that could incriminate him," and consequent1 fining
him for refusing to take the oath and answer any questions breached his Convention righ,s. Ibid.,
Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Pekkanen, Wildhaber and Makarczyk.
I
41 (App. No.6563/03), judgment of October 4,2005.
I
42 Ibid., at [lo] and [Ill.
I
43 Ibid., at [16] and [17].
f
44 Ibid., at [38].The Court noted that in other cases right to silence violations were foung where
the individual was later acquitted of the underlying offence, Heaney and McGuiness v Ireland,
(2001) 33 E.H.R.R. 12, and even where it was no longer possible to pursue the ~nderlying~charge.
Funke v France, (1993)16 E.H.R.R. 297.
I

f
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Hodever, Shannon had been charged with financial offences at the time he was
summbed to appear, and the Court concluded that "attending the interview would
have i4volved a very real likelihood of being required to give information on matters
which could subsequently arise in the criminal proceedings for which the applicant
had b n charged".45 In its opinion the Court noted its concern that any information
~ h a n n h nmight have supplied could have been passed along to the police and later used
at a subsequent criminal
The option of appearing pursuant to the summons, but
declinibg to answer specific incriminatory questions was not mentioned.
On formal level Serves and Shannon are clearly distinguishable since Shannon was
facing alid charges at the time he was summoned to answer questions while Serves had
not ye been recharged with a homicide offence when he was ordered to appear before a
milita investigating judge. However, the risk of incrimination which formed the basis
of the , hannon opinion may well have been greater for Serves whose previous charge
had bden voided for technical reasons. Yet, Shannon was free to decline to answer all
questibns while Serves had to appear, take the oath, and individually assert the right to
silence!as specific self-incriminatory questions arose.
~ o d p l i c a t i nmatters
~
further is the European Court's decision in Saunders v United
~ i n ~ d o ' k .Saunders
"
was one of a number of individuals who were identified by
prosecttion officials as possible defendants in a stock scheme. He was also the subject of
an ad4inistrative inquiry into his activities and was required to appear for questioning.
~ig-nifihantly,it was found by the English courts that the relevant legislation obligated
~aundkrsto appear and answer even those questions that were self-incriminatory, and
that th/e answers could later be used against him in a criminal
The buropean Court concluded that Saunders' right to silence under the Convention
was viblated by this procedure, but its opinion focused on the fact that the prosecution
autho ities made use of his compelled statements. The Court observed that the State's
claim Illf public interest "[could not] be invoked to justify the use of the answers
comp~lsorilyobtained in a non-judicial investigation to incriminate the accused during
the tridl proceedings".49The opinion suggested that the administrative inquiry in itself,
which iinvolved compulsion to answer even self-incriminatory questions, did not violate
Art.6 $ 1of the Convention. This prompted a concurring opinion from Judge Morenilla
emphdsizing his view that it would be sufficient to raise a right to silence claim that
"the abplicantls statements had been obtained under compulsion and were considered
prosecution to be incriminating and capable of reinforcing their case".50

4

!t

45

Sbannon, fn.41 above, at [33].

46 @id.,

at [39] and [40].

47 ~h.12,
above.
48

did., at [28].

49 ldid.,

at [74]. Following Saunders, the European Court similarly concluded that answers
compelled from a bankruptcy applicant on the threat of contempt could not be used against him
in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Kansal v United Kingdom (2004) 39 E.H.R.R. 31.
50 Fn.12, above, Concurring Opinion of Judge Morenilla. Similar views were expressed in
concurring opinions of Judges De Meyer and Walsh, the latter observing that the "right to the
protection against compulsory self-incrimination is not simply a right to refuse to testify in a court
but must also apply to bodies endowed by the law with inquisitorial powers".
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European Court caselaw thus appears to suggest alternative procedural options for
individuals confronted by a demand to appear and give evidence that is backed by a
legal threat sufficient to be covered by Art.6 5 1 of the Convention. The Serves decision
holds that the appropriate response to potential compelled self-incrimination is to as~ert
the right to silence in response to potentially incriminatory questions rather than refbse
to appear at all while Shannon allowed the subject of the investigation to refuse( to
provide any information when ordered to appear and answer questions. Beyond that,
Saunders suggests that even self-incriminatory questions must be answered, with Art16§
1of the Convention only being relevant if an effort is made to use the answers provided
in a subsequent criminal proceeding.
I
One possible distinction between the cases is that only the suspect in Shannon y a s
under a valid charge at the time that he was summoned to appear and answer questi ns.
However, the European Court decision focused less on the stage of the proceedi gs
and more on the clear risk of incrimination that Shannon faced. On this basis, howe$er,
Serves should have been entitled to equivalent treatment since he had already bhen
subject to a voided charge and was clearly a likely target in the renewed investigation.
The same was true for Saunders who had already been identified as a potential accu$ed
by representatives from the UK Department of Trade and Industry and the Cropn
Prosecution S e r ~ i c e Then
. ~ ~ again, if the only issue is the later use of compelled
incriminatory information, it would appear that all subjects called to answer questipns
outside of the criminal trial itself should be required to respond, with the Convention
thereafter available to protect against improper use of the information so obtained.
Certainly the broadest protection would be a system in which the option of declqng
to appear and testify was made available to anyone facing a significant risk of splfincrimination. However, this would be a burdensome procedure since identifying the
degree of risk sufficient to invoke the right of non-appearance would be both diffiyult
and time consuming. Focusing on the stage of the proceeding, in contrast, would allpw
authorities to easily separate the two categories, but the risk here is that officials wopld
defer filing charges until the compelled interrogation was completed. The choice wopld
thus be between a system that would be difficult to administer and a process that wopld
be relatively simple to manipulate.
The option suggested by Saunders would effectively defer the right to silence ishue
until trial was underway and an effort was made to use the results of the compepd
interrogation as evidence against the accused. However, it is not clear that the majority
in Saunders fully intended this result. Moreover, it would leave anyone compelled
to participate in an investigation in an uncertain position given the absence of clear
standards defining what would constitute impermissible use of compelled eviderlce.
If the violation would only occur when statements of the individual were introdu ed
at his trial, as occurred in Saunders, authorities would be free to take advantage of he
compelled self-incrimination in other ways.
Once an individual has been charged with a criminal offence, as in Shannon, he sholld
be free of the obligation to appear and answer official questions about his conduct. p e

1

1

1
I

t

51 Fn.12 above, at [23].The representatives had already met, discussed possible charges, nd
talked about when a criminal investigation should be started prior to being questioned by the
Department of Trade and Industry inspectors.
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1

setting ay not be the criminal trial, but allowing the State to obtain information about
the offe ce after it has committed itself to prosecution would only serve to undercut
core rig t to silence values. Beyond that, individuals not yet charged should be free
to dem nstrate that their situation is comparable. The State interest can be protected
by @acihg the burden of establishing impermissible manipulation of the timing of the
charge ~n the defendant.
If in the pre-charge stage an individual is obligated to answer official questions,
and if those questions risk providing the State with incriminatory information about
the indiividual, he should be free to assert the right to silence at that point. Deferring
the righit to silence issue until a later effort is made to use the compelled information
at trial is not an adequate substitute since it will leave the defendant at a significant
disadvahtage in trying to reconstruct after the fact exactly what the State has done with
the information it compelled. Instead, the right to silence issue should be identified
and de 'ided when the questions are asked. If the government is prepared to commit to
protecti n against any misuse of the information, the guarantee should be clearly stated
then an there. This would result in explicit and legally protected immunity that is on
the rec rd in a form that would serve to supplant the incrimination risk protected by
the rigqt to silence.

6

C9
i

The dehand for documents and identification information
An official demand for documents or identification information in connection with an
investigation can raise self-incrimination issues comparable to those arising in Serves,
Shannon and Saunders where individuals were called to appear at an official proceeding
to
testimony. In each setting the recipient of the demand will be required to
produck what may turn out to be evidence that is probative of his involvement in
crimin 1 activities. Arguably, however, an obligation to appear and answer questions
places the individual at a greater disadvantage since any judgment about how to
respono will have to be made on the spot. In contrast, an order to produce items or
informition sought by the State will normally allow time for some thought about how
to respbd.
If the; State order calls for the production of potentially self-incriminatory information,
several;options are available. Assuming a valid claim of infringement of the right to
silence one possibility is that the individual may opt to resist the production. Alterna1
tively, the individual may choose to comply, leaving the right to silence issue to be raised
at som4 later point. It must be recognized as well that some individuals may respond to
the demand for information by providing a partial, misleading or perjurious response.
In Funke v Fran~e?~
French customs authorities ordered the production of statements
of bank accounts held outside of France. Funke wound up being fined for refusing to
compl$. The French Government contested the claim that this procedure was a violation
of Funkeke's
"right not to give evidence against oneself,"53 but the European Court
disagreed. It concluded instead that Funke's punishment for refusing to produce the
self-inqriminatory documents was a violation of the Convention's Art.6 right "to remain

4

52 Fn.8,

above.

53 Ibid.,

at [41].
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silent and not to contribute to incriminating himself".54In so ruling, the Court implicitly
accepted the fact that individuals are free to respond to an invalid order to pfoduce
documents by refusing to comply on the grounds of their Convention-protected right
to silence.
Despite Funke, the status of efforts to compel the production of documents I under
the Convention is unclear. In Saunders the European Court stated that right to Silence
I
protections are inapplicable to demands for:
I

"[Mlaterial which may be obtained from the accused through the use of complulsory
powers but which has an existence independent of the will of the
as, inter alia, documents acquired pursuant to a warrant, breath,
samples and bodily tissue for the purpose of DNA testing."55

Significantly, documents sought without a warrant were not mentioned as outside the
scope of Art.6. Nevertheless, it has been argued that providing protection to demands
for documents would be inappropriate because it "would come dangerously cldse to a
right to withhold any potentially incriminating material".56 Beyond that an A
General's Reference in the United Kingdom took the position that the decision
European Court are inapplicable to all efforts to compel the production of docdments,
whether by subpoena or warrant, as long as they contain no compelled statem nts of
the accused.57
More recently, in OIHalloran and Francis v United Kingd0m.5~authorities dedanded
that vehicle owners identify who had been driving their vehicles at the tide they
were identified as travelling in excess of posted speed limits. O'Halloran resdonded
by confirming that he was the driver at the time in question, while Francis iefused
to respond on the basis of the right to silence and privilege against self-incrimihation.
Thereafter O'Halloran was convicted of speeding after failing in his motion to dxclude
his admission, while Francis was convicted for refusing to provide the inforhation
sought by the government. In light of the "nature and degree of compulsion Ased to
obtain the evidence, the existence of . . . relevant safeguards in the procedure, And the
use to which [the] material so obtained was
no violation of the right to silbnce or
privilege against self-incrimination protected by the Convention was found. ~dLvever,
a different combination of these factors could produce a different conclusion. hn that
case, the choice of responding to the threat by providing the information subjdct to a
later effort to have the information excluded or refusing to provide the information at
all could determine the success of the individual's claim.

p

I

54 Ibid., at

[44].
55 Fn.12, above, at [69].
T. Ward and P. Gardner, "The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: In Search df Legal
Certainty", [2003] E.H.R.L.R. 388 at 391.
57Attorney General's Reference (No.7 of 2000), Re, (2001) 2 Cr. App. R. 19. See also
drew
Ashworth, "The Human Rights Act 1998: Part 2: Article 6 and the Fairness of Trials" (1998) Crim.
L.R. 261 at 264-265.
I
58 Fn.24, above.
I
59 Ibid., at [55].
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wishes to claim freedom from compulsion to produce potentially
or information, pursuing this objective by simply refusing
tag. The production order will usually have some penalty
that the items will be produced, and this means that
proceedings designed to impose the penalty as a
In short, the choice is to turn over the sought-after
to be charged and tried for resisting the State's

the right to make unilateral and unreviewable
grounds to refuse to turn over sought-after
docum4nts. It is the responsibility of the courts to ultimately determine whether or not
production may be resisted. In Funke that determination was made in the context of
proceeqings to impose a penalty for non-compliance. However, there is no inherent
reason p h y such a dramatic procedural choice should have to be imposed as the price
for assyting the right to silence.
Actu~llyfacing a penalty proceeding is likely to be a significant deterrent against
asserting otherwise valid rights. There is not only the risk of having a penalty actually
impose(l, but also the cost of mounting a defence. This could be averted without
encouriiging resistance to legitimate demands by creating a procedure that would allow
claims as
Such a procedure would
where self-incrimination
likelihood that information
ed would be used in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Where this was not the
claims could be reviewed expeditiously, thereby providing the
legal ruling on his or her right to silence claim. Any further
be subject to the imposition of penalties, but at least
procedural mechanism in which the right to silence
to review right to silence claims, there would
to choose to provide the sought-after
restricts their use. In contrast, when
if the $dividual is not accompanied by adequate legal representation, the risk of a
mistakqh assessment is readily apparent. This would seem to justify giving individuals
presen+d with oral demands for potentially self-incriminatory information the option
of resisting at the time or answering the questions subject to a later challenge to the
use of the information so obtained. Since these considerations are not likely to occur
where 4 demand for documents is presented, there would be no need to provide for
this altdrnative procedural option.
False, hisleading and incomplete information

To date, the European Court has not ruled against an applicant who has raised a right
to silence claim on the sole and exclusive basis that the applicant responded to an
impermissible demand for information by either lying or providing a misleading or
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incomplete response. However, the provision of false or incomplete responses to State
demands for information has been a factor in several Court decisions. The Court's
treatment of the issue strongly suggests its belief that lying, misleading or otherwise
failing to provide a complete response are not acceptable alternatives even when the
State improperly issues a demand for information.
Two cases were presented to the European Court arising out of Austrian legislation
that requires the owner of a vehicle to identify its driver at a particular time when
a driving or parking offence occurred. In both Weh v Austria60 and Reig v A k s t r i ~ , ~ ~
the car owners had been ordered to name the individual who had been driviqg their
cars in violation of local speeding laws. Even if accurate responses might haye been
self-incriminatory, the legislation specifically stated that the "right to requike such
information shall take precedence over the right to refuse to give the informatidnfl.62
The car owners in both Weh and Reig did not refuse to provide the identit9 of the
driver, something that was prohibited by the legislation itself, nor did they state t at they
were the drivers of vehicles at the relevant times, something that would have p ovided
self-incriminatory information to the State. Instead, each car owner identified someone
else as the driver, but did so in a way that authorities concluded was false, midleading
or incomplete. Both individuals were charged with violating the compulsory reporting
statute, and in neither case were charges filed for the original speeding offence^.
The European Court's resolution of the issue emphasized that at the timh of the
demand for information there were no proceedings for vehicle offences against the
parties that were either pending or anticipated,63 nor was there any " e l e ~ e n tof
suspicion"64 that the owners of the vehicles were also their drivers when anyjvehicle
offences might have occurred. Viewing the cases as presenting a connection between
potential criminal proceedings and the disclosure obligation that was llrembte and
hypothetical," the Court concluded that they lacked a "sufficiently concrete iink" to
raise a valid issue under the right to silence and privilege against self-in~rimidation.~~
Moreover, although stating that the element was not decisive in itself, thb Court
I not for
specifically noted that Weh was punished for giving inaccurate informati~n,~
refusing to respond to the State's demand,66while Reig failed to give a suf iciently
complete response.67
The perjury problem arose in a direct and dramatic form in Van Vond 1 v The
nether land^.^^ There a Parliamentary inquiry was initiated to investigate the ~I t i v i t i e s
of special crime detection units established within larger municipal police folices and
districts of the national police. The underlying legislation supporting the inquidy made
it a criminal offence to fail to appear or refuse to answer any question, wdile also
providing that any statement given in such an inquiry could not be used except in

I

1

Fn.22, above.
(App. No.63207/00), judgment of March 24,2005.
62 Motor Vehicles Act of Austria s.103 § 2, reprinted in Weh, fn.22 above, at [24].
63 Weh, fn.22 above, at [53]; Reig, fn.61 above, at [30].
61 Weh, fn.22 above, at [53], quoted in Reig, fn.61 above, at [31].
65 Weh, fn.22 above, at [56]; quoted in Reig, fn.61 above, at [31].
66 Weh, fn.22 above, at [55].
67 Reig, fn.61 above, at [12].
(App. No.38258/03) (2006), partial decision on admissibility of March 23,2006.
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a
for perjury based on the statement itself. This was sufficient for the
European ourt to conclude that there was no basis to find that "such disclosure would
have expo ed [the applicant] or any other person to a risk of criminal prosecution on
~~
that, the Court commented on the fact that the
the basis df such e ~ i d e n c e " .Beyond
applicant hesponded to the demand for information by committing pejury, stating:

6

"It m@ybe that the applicant lied in order to prevent uncovering conduct which,
might possibly be criminal and lead to a prosecution. However,
and not to incriminate oneself cannot be interpreted as giving a
to actions motivated by the desire to evade inve~tigation."~~

4

Althou h the Court's language has been unreceptive to the idea that an effort to
compel p~tentiallyself-incriminatory evidence can legitimate a false, misleading or
incompletk response, in each case alternative principles supporting the denial of the
applicants" right to silence claims were stated. Thus the matter cannot be considered
as definitkely resolved. Supporting the uncertainty is the dissenting opinion in Weh
in which lthe authors state that "[wlhen assessing a possible risk of incriminating
oneself, r\re see no reason to distinguish between situations where the owner of the
car has reiused to give any information and where he has given wrong or insufficient
inf~rmatidn".~~
As land as there is an adequate mechanism for an individual to claim his right
to silence; it is reasonable to conclude that the European Court would not sanction a
procedurAl response of pejury, misleading or incompleteinformation. As in Van Vondel,
the State bould limit itself to prosecuting the individual for the perjury contained in
the stateqent itself in which case the compelled statement would not be the source
of incriminating evidence for the prosecution of some other pre-existing offence.
Elsewhere it has been argued that the state has a strong interest in not being misled
when it rdceives information pursuant to an inquiry." For this reason, it is appropriate
to limit individuals to the options of refusing to answer specific questions based on an
assertion bf the right to silence or providing the information subject to limitations on
any later
of the response, although the later choice may ultimately make it more
difficult f ~ the
r state to secure a c o n ~ i c t i o n . ~ ~
one must recognize that the reality of a compulsory demand for information
unique pressures. The individual who is the subject of a demand for
to legal penalty for any failure to satisfactorily comply may find
unanticipated areas of inquiry where the legal risks are unclear.
I

69 Ibid., at

[The Law].

Ibid.
71 Weh, fn.22 above, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Lorenzen, Levits and Hajiyev, at [2].
70

I

72 Pete4 Westen and Stewart Mandell, "To Talk, to Balk, or to Lie: The Emerging Fifth
~mendmehtDoctrine of the 'Preferred Response"' (1982) 19 American Criminal Law Review 521,
pp.528-533. Along with concern over the state being misled, the authors also note that disallowing
pejury as an acceptable response is further justified on the grounds that lying in itself is morally
unacceptable.
73

Ibid.
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Legal representation may or may not be available, but in any event the individual may
have to make a quick choice among a series of undesirable options.
Beyond that, legal assurances against future use of compelled information may not
be clear or easily verified, nor will they necessarily leave the individual free of all
potential adverse criminal consequences. The European Court did not indicate whether
compelled statements could be used as a basis for prosecution decisions, as investigatory
leads to other evidence that the State might wish to offer against the individual, or as
admissible to counter other testimony the accused may offer in court. All of thesq factors
suggest at least the possibility that there may be some settings in which the ipterests
furthered by the right to silence might outweigh the interests of the state in discouraging
false, misleading or incomplete responses to a demand for potentially incriqinatory
information. Neither Weh, Reig, nor Van Vondel necessarily foreclose this possibility.

The warning and notification issue

I

I

To what extent should individuals be warned of their self-incrimination rights? No
doubt many who are presented with State demands for information are alreadji aware
of their right to silence at the time they must make a decision whether and ihow to
respond. Others, however, may not be aware of their rights and may not hav ready
access to legal counsel. Moreover, even those familiar with the right to silence may
feel pressured by the authorities, and for them a warning would serve to deQse the
pressure and permit them to make a voluntary and reasoned choice. But there is also
the possibility that a notice or warning could have the opposite effect by heightening
the pressure on the individual to respond to the State's demand, thereby condibuting
to the creation of an impermissibly coercive environment that might itself renher any
resulting statement inadmissible.
A number of cases have been presented to the European Court involving UK
legislation that permits adverse inferences from silence in situations involving a sbspectls
failure to answer police questions or a criminal defendant's failure to take the hitness
stand at his criminal
UK law specifically requires that the suspect be i formed
by the officer who undertakes to question him both of the right to remain silen as well
as the potential adverse inference from silence that may later be drawn by the fa tfinder
in court." Similarly, the criminal defendant must be advised that his failure to jake the
witness stand can be used against him by the f a ~ t f i n d e rIn
. ~upholding
~
the legitipcy of
~ European Court has frequently n ted the
drawing adverse inferences from s i l e n ~ e ?the
fact that the system specifically includes a warning that this consequence may ensue.78
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74 Criminal Justice and

Public Order Act 1994 c.33 at §§ 34-39.

I

at 34,36,37.
i
at 35.
77Murray, fn.10 above. It is important that the factfinder be properly instructe on the
circumstances justifying the drawing of an adverse inference. These require that th jury be
satisfied that assertion of the right to silence "could only sensibly be attributed to [ther being ]
no answer or none that would stand up to cross-examination". Condron, fn.27 above, at 1611.
78 E.g. Murray, fn.10 above, at [I11, quoting the caution to Murray "that if you fail to mention
any fact which you rely on in your defence in court. . . it may be treated in court as suppo ting any
75 Ibid.,

I

76 Ibid.,
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Whatlthe Court has not had to address is whether a system of adverse inferences from
silence bould be permissible in the absence of a warning. When this issue has been
to the United States Supreme Court, its response has been a multi-category
analysig. Where a suspect under custodial interrogation had been specifically warned
of his ribht to remain silent, the so-called Miranda warning under American law," no
adverse/inference from silence may be drawn. The Court considered that it would be
funda+ntally unfair to use silence against an accused after receipt of a Miranda warning
since the warning itself contains an implicit assurance against adverse consequences
On the other hand, a pre-Miranda warning failure to reveal information
from ~ilknce.~'
to the aythorities may be used to impeach inconsistent statements made at trial since the
individyal could not claim any implicit assurance against such a consequence.81Broader
use of pre-Miranda silence can be found at the lower court level where it has been held
that silehce in the face of an accusation may be considered as a tacit admission which
may be )usedas substantive evidence of guilt.M Finally, American law strictly forbids
any adyerse comment on the criminal defendant's failure to take the witness stand.83
Whilq this analysis addresses a number of important adverse inference issues, it does
not ansyer the question of whether a warning is a prerequisite where official questioning
produc$s an incriminatory response. Warnings may well be a wise policy choice for
individqal signatory nations, but it is not clear that the very generalized standards of
the Eur~peanConvention would necessarily make them a required procedural feature
of the Cpnvention-based right to silence in all situations.
Howgver, even if not mandated, the absence of a warning would certainly be a
factor o{ relevance in determining whether or not the environment leading to the
incrimiqatory statement was coercive. Conversely, where conditions of confinement
were severe, and where access to counsel was not made available during intense
questioping, the European Court concluded that the giving of the UK warning, which
include? the threat of adverse consequences from silence, could become "an element
which eightened [the suspect's] vulnerability to the relentless rounds of interrogation
on the ftrst days of his d e t e n t i ~ n " .This
~ ~ is a somewhat unusual context, and there is
no indiqation that the Court would find warnings generally coercive in the more typical
interro~ationenvironment.
European Convention proceedings in which notice issues were raised in the
to silence claims are also worthy of note. In Abas v The nether land^:^ the
applicagt was convicted of tax evasion. He sought to exclude as evidence information he
provide to the authorities pursuant to their demand. He argued before the European
Commigsion that he was in a position similar to that of a suspect questioned about a

I

P

I

I

relevant evidence against you". See also, Condron, fn.27 above, at [15]; Averill v United Kingdom,
fn.31 abqve, at [Ill and [13]; Beckles v United Kingdom, fn.31 above, at [12].
79 ~ i r a n d a
v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Dople v Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
Fle cher v Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982 (per curiam); Jenkins v Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
Sta e v Peebles, 569 S.W.2d 1(Mo. App. 1978).The Supreme Court has not addressed whether
this constitutes an infringement of the American self-incrimination privilege.
83 G r i ' n v California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
Magee, fn.32 above, at [43].
85 (App. No.27943/95), Commission admissibility decision of February 26,1997.
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criminal offence, and therefore was entitled to the protection of the right to silence. He
noted, in particular, that there was no warning that he was not obligated to answer any
questions or provide information that might be self-incriminatory.
Based on these facts, the Netherlands Supreme Court found that there wag no basis
to conclude that there was reasonable suspicion of a criminal offence at the kime that
the demand for information was made, and thus no right to silence violation bccurred.
The European Commission agreed with this conclusion, suggesting as a rule of law that
right to silence protections would not be available in such preliminary proceedings.
However, since the official investigation continued following a search of the applicant's
family home, protections afforded by Art.6 of the Convention arose. But the Cohmission
offered no disagreement with the Netherlands Supreme Court position that there is no
duty to give a caution in the context of a written demand for information "ah there is
no direct confrontation between the interrogator and the interrogated persoq and the
latter is not required to immediately answer the questions put to him or her."?6
It is certainly true that the characteristics of a face-to-face interrogation are lharkedly
different than situations in which an individual receives a written deIfiand for
information. The latter allows the individual to take advantage of the op+ortunity
to secure legal advice and exercise reasoned judgment. While that does dot mean
that informing individuals of their rights and the risks they face are inapbropriate
requirements, it is difficult to consider decisions made in such a context qs unfair.
Overall, it is unlikely that the Court would view the Convention as imposing apy notice
or warning requirement unless the official demand for an answer or for other p&tentially
self-incriminatory information had the attributes of an oral interrogation.
The failure to warn was also a factor in the European Court's more recent decision
in Macko and Kozubal v S l o ~ a k i a The
. ~ ~ concern expressed by Macko was th t he was
punished for refusing to make statements as a witness in a criminal case agains , another.
He claimed that his refusal was in reliance on a Code of Criminal Procedure rovision
allowing him not to respond if his statement involved the risk that criminal pr$eedings
would be brought against him or someone else close to him. He complained further
that he had never been warned that he was subject to a fine nor was he
investigator that his situation precluded the bringing of criminal
him. As a result of this background, the Court rejected the
was manifestly ill-founded, and held it to be admissible
If the Court's ultimate ruling favours the applicant, it could be interpreted to mean that
authorities are required to notify individuals that they do not face an incriminqtion risk
before they may insist on answers to potentially self-incriminatory questions. iIt would
further suggest that in the context of at least face-to-face questioning, individuals should
know exactly where they stand before they may be compelled to respond. his would
include information concerning the right not to answer potentially self-incrikninatory
questions, the risk of adverse consequences if the questions are not answer&, and a
clear statement of freedom from potential adverse consequences if answers are equired
despite their potential self-incriminatory character. Provision of this informatiop insures
that the individual being questioned can make an intelligent choice among the gvailable

7
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87

Ibid., at [Relevant Domestic Law and Practice].
(App. Nos 64054/00 and 64071/00), admissibility decision of January 5,2006.
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rather than being subjected to unknown consequences following whatever
e may ultimately make.

The debelopment of a jurisprudence of self-incrimination by the European Court of
Huma Rights has been marked by the Court's clear recognition that the task requires
sensiti ity to the complex of interests that are involved. The result has been an emerging
right t silence under the ECHR that recognizes the general principle that the state may
not co pel an unwilling individual to incriminate himself, but also respects the right
of the s ate to acquire information for non-criminal purposes. Additionally, the Court's
careful1balancing process does not prohibit the state from using the exercise of the
right t silence as a basis for adverse inferences in criminal cases, albeit under limited
circum tances and with appropriate jury instructions.
~imiiarcare will need to be taken when the Court directly addresses the procedural
issues hat can arise as part of the invocation of the right to silence. The fact that an
individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself does not necessarily mean that
I
he must be informed of the right or that he has the option to commit perjury in the face
of impkrmissible compulsion. If the setting presents a clear risk of incrimination, the
right t silence may or may not justify the individual's assertion of the right to refuse to
appear for official questioning as opposed to being obligated to appear, subject to the
right tqI assert a privilege of silence in the face of specific incriminatory questions.
In right to silence cases presented to the European Court thus far, related procedural
issues have been present, but they have not served as the exclusive basis for any of the
Court' decisions. Consequently, how the Court would resolve these issues is largely
a matt r of inference. However, if future cases present procedural right to silence
proble s in a form that makes their resolution outcome determinative, the Court will
no dou t undertake a careful weighing of competing interests just as it has done in the
context of the substantive right to silence questions it has addressed. The answers the
Court ives will have a substantial influence on the breadth and scope of right to silence
protect ons under the ECHR.
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